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Abstract: Ensuring resilient operation and control of smart grids is fundamental for empowering
their deployment, but challenging at the same time. Accordingly, this study proposes a novel
methodology for evaluating resilience of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) systems
for smart distribution grids. Analysing how the system behaves under changing operating conditions
a power system perspective allows to understand how resilient the smart distribution grid is,
but the resilience of the ICT system in charge of its operation affects the overall performance of
the system and does, therefore, condition its resilience. With the aim of systematising the evaluation
of ICT systems’ resilience, this study proposes to combine a standardized modelling of Smart Grids,
the Smart Grid Architecture Model (SGAM), with a data structured diagram, the Entity Relationship
Model (ERM). The architecture of smart distribution grids is analysed through SGAM. Then, their
technical characteristics and functionalities are defined and represented in a ERM diagram. Finally,
the attributes or properties of the system components are used to formulate resilience indicators
against different types of disturbances. This methodology is then applied to analyse the resilience of
a ICT platform being developed in EMPOWER H2020 project.
Keywords: resilience; distribution grids; smart grids; Distributed Energy Resources; Smart Grid
Architecture Model; Entity Relationship Model
1. Introduction
The performance of traditional power transmission systems has usually been assessed by its ability
to resist disturbances and to recover efficiently in case of failure. Existing resilience indices would
give insight of the system reliability and its robustness against a set of disturbances (e.g., component
failure) [1]. As traditional transmission grids were static constructions with the relatively invariable
task of transmitting power form a central power plant to a decentralized network of loads, it made
sense to assess its performance with invariable and static metrics as the Average Service Availability
Index (ASAI) among others [1].
These new grid elements, together with constant changes within the environment in which
the distribution system operates, create new requirements for the power system to be fully performant.
With the new functionalities that are being assessed to the distribution grid, sufficient robustness does
no longer mean sufficient performance, as static robustness may be interfering with the flexibility
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of the grid, which is required to control the wide variety of new components that are being added.
In other words, a transition is taking place in which the distribution grid is becoming a dynamic
system that evolves towards new equilibria over time. All the above aspects are making more difficult
to determine how resilient smart distributed systems are.
On the other hand, distribution grids are bringing not only new grid elements, but also new
actors and roles. The electrical exchanges enabled by local generation, consumption and storage units,
as well as by their derived flexibility, are leading to economic transactions which could be managed
locally in the so-called local electricity markets [2], also known as micromarkets in some studies [3].
A key actor for the local energy markets deployment is the so-called Smart Energy Service Provider
(SESP) [4,5]. It is the entity responsible for the operation and control of the different units in these
local electricity markets. Additionally, the SESP is their aggregator, trading electricity in wholesale
markets. The SESP information exchange with these elements is possible thanks to Information
and Communication Technologies (ICT) based platform. In this sense, in order to ensure a resilient
operation of the distribution grid, the ICT platform itself, must be resilient too. The assessment of
the resiliency of ICTs for smart distribution grids is the focus of this the present study.
The resilience concept, for its broadness and wide range of application, has lead to several studies
in the literature. A review of approaches to resilience definition and assessment is performed in [6].
The need for resilience metrics in energy systems is stated in [7], where a matrix-based approach is
developed to generate resilience indicators. Focusing on resilience of distribution systems, it has been
analysed from very different perspectives. The authors from [8] define and analyse the resilience of
electric distribution systems integrating microgrids. The resilience of a distributed algorithm that
operates and controls a microgrid has been analysed in [9]. The potential of microgrids as a resilience
resource is evaluated in [10].
Regarding resilience of ICT systems, some studies have analysed it without restricting the field
of application of these ICT. Resilience in communication networks has been studied in [11],
presenting principles for designing resilient networks and techniques to analyse network resilience.
The requirements for resilient ICTs are described in [12], where the qualitative evaluation of resiliency is
done in terms of ICT service continuation. If ICT service can still continue even if the ICT is affected by
a disaster, the resiliency of such ICT is considered high. The resilience of control systems is addressed
through an automated control approach in [13], identifying a resilient control problem where a linear
dynamic system is subject to the replay and Denial-of-Service attacks. On the other hand, an approach
for selecting architectures in a connected infrastructure system to increase resilience of the overall
infrastructure system is presented in [14].
The specificities of the control and communication architecture of smart distribution grids, which
imply different actors, roles, elements and functions compared to other systems, justify dedicated
studies of resilience of ICT for their operation. However very few studies evaluate of the resilience
of the ICT platforms for operating smart distribution grids. Additionally, most of them address their
resilience focusing only on the vulnerabilities resulting from cyber attacks [15].
Taking into account the limited analysis of resilience of ICT systems in smart distribution grids,
this paper proposes a novel methodology to evaluate it taking advantage of the combination of two
existing tools. One is the standardized modelling of Smart Grids proposed by CENELEC [16], Smart
Grid Architecture Model (SGAM) and the other one is an extended method for structuring data
diagrams: the Entity Relationship Model (ERM). Although these are well-developed tools, their use
to assess resiliency as proposed in this methodology is not being addressed in smart grids context.
The novel methodology developed allows to determine the criticality of functions and elements
involved in ICT systems for operating smart distribution grids in a systematic way.
This study is structured as follows. First, resilience concept is particularised for application
in distribution grids (see Section 2). Then, a methodology to assess resilience of ICT systems for
smart distribution grids is developed in Section 3, based on the Entity-Relationship model. Next, this
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methodology is applied to a case study in Section 4 to evaluate the resilience of a ICT platform for local
energy markets operation. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2. Defining Resilience
Before developing the methodology for resilience evaluation of ICT systems, the resilience
concept assumed is clarified. The traditional centrally operated transmission grid is a complex,
but mainly steady system with only a few well defined functionalities and a rather static infrastructure.
Therefore, much of the literature found in electrical engineering defines resilience based on the ability
of a system to “bounce back” to its initial and invariable state after a disturbance. On the other
hand, the transition towards decentralized smart distribution grids is characterized by the dynamics
of integrating new technologies and new participants into the grid. Therefore, resilience for smart
distributed power systems will have some additional features that take into account the grids capacity
to evolve towards new equilibria. When interpreting the transmission grid as a single equilibrium
system with invariable functionalities, it was sufficient to assess its ability to resist and recover from
foreseeable disturbances. In other words, its resilience was assessed on its robustness and reliability.
To take the recent power system evolutions on distribution grids into account, this paper will use
a resilience definition considering the static and dynamic performance of the smart grids. As such,
the definition of resilience in the context of smart distribution grids can be summarized as stated
in [17]: “The ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly
from disruptions”. Taking into account the previous resilience definition and similarly to [18], resilience
can be divided into five quantifiable characteristics: reliability, adaptive capacity, elasticity, plasticity,
and evolvability. The first three terms are describing short term resilience or how the system reacts
when a disturbance occurs. The last two terms, plasticity and evolvability, describe long term resilience,
or the systems ability to evolve and adapt after undergoing disturbances. Moreover, a distinction is
made between dynamic and static resilience characteristics. Table 1 gives an overview of the five
resilience characteristics, classified according to the affected time frame.
Figure 1 represents a certain performance metric of a system in function of time, illustrating
the different stages of a disturbance. The time period (te−t0) indicates the time during which the system
is able to maintain its full performance while undergoing a disturbance, (td−te) is the period in which
performance decreases to a certain level in which the system remains for the time period (ts−td).
Finally, recovery begins at ts and is complete at time t f . The following paragraphs describe how each
of the five resilience characteristics relate to the performance curve in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. System performance variation during a disturbance and its characteristics (figure adapted
from [19]).
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Table 1. The five characteristics of resilience.
Static Dynamic
Short term reliability elasticity, adaptation capacity
Long term plasticity evolvability
2.1. Reliability
The term is used to describe how well a system can withstand anticipated disturbances, namely
high probability, low impact events. For instance, power line failures are foreseeable failures, and
can be resolved by building redundancy into the system, making it more reliable. The reliability
of the system is about building a system that is robust enough to resist disturbances. Therefore
reliability is a property that has to be implemented in the design stage of the system. It requires
a top-down approach, by anticipating on the possible disturbances that can occur during the systems
lifetime. Moreover, as reliability only assesses if a system is functional or non-functional, it is a static
characteristic, that does not change over time. In Figure 1, the system is fully functional during the
time period (t0−te). The longer this period, the more reliable the system is.
2.2. Adaptation Capacity
If a system cannot withstand a certain disturbance, it will be degraded to a lower level of
performance, and this process is represented in time period (td−te) in Figure 1. This period represents
the adaptive capacity of a systemor how well the system can tolerate a disturbance before getting
fully degraded. The longer this period, the more controlled the degradation will be, which can limit
the overall damage caused by the disturbance, and indicates a higher ease of adaptation of the system.
2.3. Elasticity
Similar to metallurgy, elasticity in this context refers to the ability of a system to fully return or
bounce back, to its original state after undergoing a deformation. In Figure 1, elasticity encompasses the
time range from a fully degraded state of the system (ts−td) up to the recovery period (t f−ts), included.
If the system fails to fully recover the damage, then the loss of performance is irreversible and becomes
a long term characteristic, described as plasticity. The more efficient the recovery, the more resilient
the system.
2.4. Plasticity
As stated earlier, the terminology used in metallurgy can be applied in the context of resilience
too. When a system undergoes irreversible damage, in other words, can no longer bounce back to
its original equilibrium state, it loses its elasticity and the loss of system properties is described by
plasticity. In Figure 1, this is shown by the difference between the initial fully performant state (at 100%
performance rate), and the degraded state after recovery (at 80% performance rate). Once a system
has plasticity, it won’t change over time, hence it is a static characteristic. Plasticity is not a favorable
characteristic of resilience, as an elastic system is much more flexible.
2.5. Evolvability
This term refers to the ease with which a system can adapt itself to changes or improve itself
by learning from the disturbances it undergoes. For instance, Figure 1 shows how a system adapts
its behavior after a first disturbance, resulting in improved operation during a second disturbance
cycle, where the system recovery initiates faster and the recovery time is shorter (improved elasticity)
and does not suffer from additional plasticity. Evolvability is a characteristic that changes over time,
together with the changes undergone by disturbances.
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3. Multidimensional Approach for Resilience Evaluation
To assess how a disturbance affects the performance of a control system for distribution grids,
this paper proposes the methodology shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Workflow of the methodology.
First, the assessed system needs to be characterized. This includes identifying its main
functionalities or High Level Functions (HLF) and representing the whole structure and elements
involved through the Smart Grid Architecture Model (SGAM) (see Section 3.1). Then, the obtained
structure is related to the system’s main functionalities (e.g., remote monitoring, load and generation
forecasting, communication with users and clients of the system) through a functional decomposition,
as reflected in Section 3.2.
In order to specify the relationships between the different elements, the entities of the system
defined by means of its properties (attributes) are identified in a conceptual Entity Relationship Model
(ERM), according to Section 3.3. With the ERM, the share or importance of each of the system’s entities
in performing the main functionalities of the system can be identified. When a disturbance occurs
in a certain element, the ERM model makes it possible to quantify the degree of impact it has on
the overall performance of the system, for each of its main functionalities.
The entity-relationship model, together with the functional decomposition of assessed system
form the basis for the presented resilience analysis framework (see Section 3.4). The resulting resilience
evaluation framework gives an indication of the resilience of the control system with respect to
the element in which the disturbance occurs. The more a disturbance affects the overall system
performance, the less resilient the system is with regard to the involved element.
The before-described methodology will be applied to a particular case in Section 4.
3.1. Use Case Definition through SGAM Methodology
Prior to the evaluation of the resilience of a system, the involved elements and general operation
procedures need to be analysed. This can be achieved determining the system technical architecture
using the Smart Grid Architecture Model (SGAM) methodology. The Smart Grid Architecture Model
(SGAM) is a three dimensional representation of the smart grid architecture established by the Smart
Grid Coordination Group, a working group that is in charge of fulfilling the M/490 EU Mandate on
smart grids standardization [16].
The SGAM distinguishes different levels of functionality of the smart grid by decomposing it into
different layers of operability, zones, and domains. The Smart Grid zones are classified depending on
the procedures involved: process, station, operation, enterprise and market. The Smart Grid domains
can cover generation, transmission, distribution, Distributed Energy Resources (DER) and customer
premises. There are five interoperability layers, namely the component, communication, information,
function, and business layers, which represent the hierarchical levels on which stakeholders interact
in a smart grid system. The SGAM model standardizes the definition of smart grid functionalities and
allows to define use cases to describe its main functionalities or HLF.
The advantage of the multidimensional framework is that smart grid functionalities can be
expressed independently from the physical set-up of the system or from its participants. As such,
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a system represented through an SGAM can be adopted by different technologies and actors, and can
fit in different regulatory delimitations.
3.2. Functional Decomposition
According to this methodology, resilience is assessed by looking at how the main system
functionalities are executed by a combination of multiple elements of the system. To do so, the main
functionalities or HLFs are decomposed into a set of less complex functions. To analyze which
element executes what part of each of the main HLFs, these functionalities are decomposed into
a combination of secondary functions (SFs), which are in turn subdivided in a set of primary
functions (PFs).
These functions get input parameters in brackets, and deliver an output accordingly. The following
input types can be required:
• Entities: they represent the physical components, actors or ICT links that execute the PFs. Some
PFs require more than one entity to be executed, namely when the executing entity needs to send
something to a receiving entity or when intermediary entities are required. Hence the possible
entities are:
– executing entity: the entity performing the PF.
– receiving entity: the entity receiving data from the executing entity.
– intermediary entity: the entity that processes the output of the executing entity to complete
the function execution.
• Attributes: they represent the data that is processed by the PF. They refer to a set of variables
characterizing the concerned entity, and for the same attribute, the set can vary depending on
the entity. For example, the attribute ’technical characteristics’ would include maximal charging
capacity if the entity would be a storage device, which wouldn’t be included for a controllable
load. There can be three types of attributes:
– primary attributes: they specify the basic attributes defined by entities (e.g., operational
characteristics to notify if the device is operational or controllable, technical characteristics to
detail the maximal capacity or the control strategy of an inverter, weather forecast information
like irradiance or temperature, etc.)
– composed attributes(): these are the result of applying a PF on primary attributes. Composed
attributes are denoted by adding brackets, and the input parameters can be primary or
composed attributes. They can be a combination of primary attributes, a calculation or
a notification (e.g., report(), request(), command(), etc.).
– set of attributes(): some entities will receive primary attributes from several identical
executing entities, and aggregate these in a set of identical attributes with different values.
This is comparable to an array 〈 〉 in object oriented programming. A set of attributes is
denoted by enclosing the input attribute type with square brackets. An example of its
functionality is when a set of attributes is used to notify metering values, including several
current, voltage or power values in the same array.
• Time execution: it refers to the moment at which a function is executed. This can either be
periodically or at discrete moments.
– periodically: every 5 min (e.g., data acquisition), 60 min, 24 h (e.g., data retrieval by SESP
from SCADA), monthly (e.g., billing), etc.
– discrete: on request (e.g., SESP requests customer information), event triggered (e.g., send
alarm if resource gets disconnected), executed by other PF (when PF monitor() registers and
event, PF send() will consequently be executed).
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• Algorithm: it corresponds to the mathematical model that is used to calculate a certain output.
The algorithm won’t be specified in this work, it will be considered as a black box with input
parameters, and returning composed attributes as output parameters.
Primary Functions
The PFs represent the basic actions that can be executed by different entities of the system.
A sequence of PFs can be combined to form a SF.
The eight PFs identified are described below.
• set(executing entity, attributes, time resolution) This function represents the action of changing
the values of a certain attribute for an entity. Most of the time, an entity will execute this PF after
receiving a command from another entity, in other words in discrete time periods, but it can also
be done periodically through an automated system.
• get(executing entity, intermediary entity, attributes, time execution) This function is executed
after receiving a request message or periodically. It returns the values of the input parameters
that can be primary or composed attributes.
• calculate(executing entity, attributes, time execution, algorithm) This function is the basis for
every computation that has to be performed.
• aggregate(executing entity, attributes, time execution) This represents the action of putting
together a set of attributes. For instance, when entities send the same attributes to a central
entity, the latter will aggregate the received attributes for further data processing.
• distribute(executing entity, receiving entity, attributes, time execution) This represents the action
of decomposing a set of attributes into individual attributes. It is the opposite function of the PF
aggregate, and is executed when an entity receives a set of attributes from which each individual
attribute needs to be transferred to a specific receiving entity.
• store(executing entity, receiving entity, attributes, time execution) This function receives data
from a certain entity and stores it into a database.
• monitor(executing entity, attributes, time execution) This function is giving a trigger to its
executing entity when values of attributes change. This change can be then used to execute
other PFs.
However, as the way distribution grids are managed is changing, new SFs and HLFs can arise,
leading to new functionalities and therefore to the definition of new PFs.
3.3. Entity-Relationship Model
The Entity-Relationship (ER) diagram is used to define the relationships between elements of
a certain system. In order to assess the resilience of a control system, the entire system is organized
and represented graphically in an ER model. The ER diagram identifies the interactions between
the system components and defines how each functionality is linked to the elements that participate in
realizing this function.
An ER model uses three elements to represent a system and its functionalities: entities, attributes,
cardinality and ordinality.
• Entity: it defines a component of the system, regardless of being a physical element, an human
operator or a digital communication line. Certain entities can be divided into more specific
categories or sub-type entities.
• Attributes: an entity is defined by attributes, representing the characteristics of the entity.
Technical parameters are implemented in the ER model as attributes, but also unique identifiers
and resilience indicators are implemented as attributes for each entity. The values of the attributes
will vary for each instance of a certain entity and may vary during the operation time of the system.
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• Methods: they correspond to the PFs discussed previously. Methods describe the relation between
two entities, as they define how entities interact.
• Cardinality and ordinality: they characterize the relationships between the entities. In particular,
cardinality refers to the maximum number of times an instance in one entity can be associated
with instances in the related entity. In contrast, ordinality refers to minimum number of times an
instance in one entity can be associated with an instance in the related entity. Both are represented
by a line and its endpoint.
3.4. Resilience Evaluation Framework
Once all the entities have been identified and the relationships between each of them have been
represented in an ER diagram, it becomes possible to quantify resilience as a function of any change
or disturbance that can affect the performance of the system. On the one hand, the system has to be
resilient against discrete changes or disturbances. On the other hand, against continuous evolution of
the system itself and its environment. Examples of discrete changes can be a cyber attack, a component
failure or human error, while continuous changes are more related to regulatory changes, ageing
infrastructure, new economical recessions or changes of mindset of different actors.
Each of these changes or disturbances have different effects on the operation of system. Some
of these effects will cause a more severe damage than others. Therefore, to analyze the resilience
it is necessary to identify the potential disturbances, their consequences and the set of attributes
that quantify the consequences of the previously identified disturbances. The literature review
already indicated that changes or disturbances can occur in three different dimensions: in the physical
dimension, the ICT network (digital dimension) and in the socio-economical dimension [17].
The proposed resilience evaluation framework allows to assess the system resilience on different
levels: either in function of a certain element of the system or in function of its main functionalities
or resilience dimension. Thus, it is possible to apply the resilience analysis on general system level,
as much as on each specific component level. According to this, system resilience can be improved by
either making the control system less dependent on the element that is bringing the disturbance into
the system or by improving the resilience of the element itself.
3.4.1. Resilience of High Level Function from the Dimensions Perspective
The first resilience assessing approach looks at the requirements of each HLF using the quality
attributes of entities to define resilience indicators for each dimension of resilience: physical
infrastructure, the socio-economic environment, and the ICT network.
Physical Dimension
The physical dimension of the system encompasses all the physical elements of the system, such as
loads and generators, monitoring devices, computers, local controllers, cables and sensors, connected
mobile phones, etc. This is the most tangible dimension where disturbances and changes can be easily
anticipated: component failures, unsynchronized or delayed operation of devices, etc.
Digital Dimension
The digital dimension represents the ICT layer that is interconnecting and allows the operation of
the physical elements of the distribution grid. It includes all the communication networks between the
different grid components, the automation processes of the control system, the forecasting algorithms,
the databases used for storage, etc.
Socio-Economic Dimension
The socio-economic dimension is placing the purely technical system composed of a physical
and digital layer into a cultural context. The operation and performance of the control system that is
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analyzed depends to a large extent on how it is being used by its operators. In addition, it depends on
the behavior of other participants (prosumers for example). Moreover, local policies and other existing
technologies may limit the number of possibilities of the system, affecting its performance too.
In each dimension, specific resilience indicators are defined in function of the requirements that
every component of the dimension has in order to perform the HLF. Indicators are chosen to cover
all the five characteristics of resilience according to the adopted resilience definition in Section 2.
As a result, one can assess which resilience dimension plays a more important role for the performance
of the assessed HLF.
When the potential disturbances are evaluated, these attributes can serve as metrics to translate
these disturbances into quantifiable consequences for the system. For example, to quantify the system
resilience against a denial of service (DoS) attack, which sends a very large amount of requests to
a certain monitoring device, one can use the quality attributes of the communication link entities
quantifying the available memory space and data flux capacity to deal with the attack.
3.4.2. Resilience of HLF in Function of Component Criticality
The second resilience assessment approach is based on an importance analysis and criticality
assessment. This approach makes use of the ER diagram to calculate the number of sequences of PFs
that are necessary to perform a certain HLF. It makes use of the cardinality to multiply the number
of PFs executed by an entity by the number of instances of that entity that are present in the system.
The more a HLF is dependent on a specific entity, the more critical this entity is to the performance of
the global system.
4. Case Study: EMPOWER H2020 Project
4.1. EMPOWER Project Description
The methodology described in Section 3 has been applied to evaluate the resilience of the
ICT platform of the local market it operates, which is the focus of the EMPOWER H2020 project.
Entitled Local Energy Retail Markets For Prosumer Smart Grid Power Services, EMPOWER belongs to the
topic Modernising the European electricity grid: Distribution grid and retail market of the call Competitive
Low-Carbon Energy of the HORIZON 2020 work programme 2014-2015. The project main objective is
the local energy markets development. Innovative business models are being proposed and promoted
to take advantage of the flexibility of generation, load and storage units at distribution level [20] and
these models are setting the rules of the local markets operation [21]. On the other hand, an ICT
platform is being designed to manage this flexibility based on the suggested business models. The ICT
platform enables and manages the operation of the system, exchanging the signals between the SESP,
brain of the system, and the field elements in order to ensure maximum welfare. The resilience of
the whole distribution grid is strongly dependent on the resilience of the ICT platform governing its
operation, making then essential the quantification of the ICT resilience to understand the resilience of
the whole system.
4.2. EMPOWER Use Case Definition through SGAM Methodology
4.2.1. The Distribution Grid
The electric system analysed covers LV (Low Voltage) and MV (Medium Voltage) distribution
grid and includes prosumers installations and DER facilities. The main actors intervening are
prosumers, DER’s owners, the Distribution System Operator (DSO) and the SESP. Prosumers, DERs
and community neighbourhoods provide flexibility to the system and are rewarded based on SESP
decisions. To participate in the local market they need to accomplish the contracts agreed with the SESP
and provide the required information of the flexible sources. According to its SGAM representation,
the system domains include Prosumers and DER installations up to the Distribution Grid. The zones
Energies 2017, 10, 1287 10 of 16
identified as Market and Enterprise cover the control systems that make SESP operation possible
(market, metering and control systems). The market system is responsible for the management
of transactions needed to implement a local energy market. The control system is in charge of
the management of the orders, scheduled and determined in the market system. The metering system
manages the data obtained from the monitoring and control devices on the Field zone. They are mainly
smart meters and local controllers, as depicted in Figure 3 with boxes named SM and LC respectively.
They allow to connect the SESP with the zone where the electrical exchanges take place (Process Zone).
The detailed interoperability layers, reflecting in detail the components needed, the communication
protocols and networks used and the specific information exchanged are explained in [22].
...
DER installations Prosumer 1 Prosumer n-1 Prosumer n
Process
Field
Station
Enterprise
Operation
Market
SMLCSMLCSMLCSMSMSM
DOMAINS
Distribution grid
ZONES
LCLCLC
SESP
Figure 3. System architecture based on SGAM.
4.2.2. The ICT Platform
The SESP system, which operates the distribution grid through an ICT platform, is responsible for
executing several functions to manage the smart distribution grid and its local energy market. A first
responsibility of the SESP is to monitor the physical assets of the system (solar panels and appliances
in households, storage devices, etc.). It also communicates with the participants of the distributed
grid, such as the DSO and households. Moreover, the SESP uses data analytics to create control
plans and sends the necessary commands to its physical assets for the execution of the control plans.
The SESP signals are exchanged with field elements through Local Controllers (LC). SESP platform
functionalities cover mainly three areas: communication with consumers, remote control execution
and flexibility prediction. In order to perform them, 6 HLF have been identified and explained in
next section.
4.3. EMPOWER Functional Descomposition
High Level Functions
For this system, the following six functionalities or HLF of the SESP have been identified:
• HLF 1—Asset managing: to manage the distributed energy resources of the local market
participants, such as registering their technical and commercial characteristics or notifying
the market participant of eventual resource status changes.
• HLF 2—Forecasting: the SESP estimates future load and generation profiles on the basis of which
it can then estimate the flexibility that will be available for the next dispatch in the local market.
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• HLF 3—Control plan creation: given a flexibility request from the DSO and the forecasted
flexibility prediction, the SESP calculates an optimal dispatch for each participating resource.
• HLF 4—Remote control: based on the control plan created by the SESP, it sends control commands
to the LCs of each participation resource to adapt their operation (production, consumption,
turning on or off, etc.).
• HLF 5—Monitoring: on field level, smart meters and other sensors are installed to periodically
measure the consumption and generation values of each resource. Moreover, special events, for
example when a device gets disconnected or when a customer denies to follow the instructions of
the control commands, are also monitored by the SESP.
• HLF 6—Customer Service: this HLF encompasses everything that is related to communication
with the customer, such as graphical overviews of their production and consumption made
available through smartphone or web browsers. It includes monthly billing notifications, contact
for the help desk, etc.
These HLF represent the overall functionality of the SESP, and each of them consists of a series of
sub-functions or use cases.
4.4. Primary and Secondary Functions
As an example, this section identifies the PFs and SFs between SESP and customer resources.
Figure 4 is a graphical representation of the set of sequences to communicate between the SESP and
the LC. The figure also indicates which attributes can be sent in each direction.
Figure 4. Sequence of PFs to exchange data between the SESP and the Local Controller.
The PFs from SESP to local controllers are:
• send(SESP, LC, CL2, attributes)
• distribute(LC, attributes, send())
The intermediary entity is always a communication link (CL), and the attributes can be request()
when the SESP asks the local controller for status or characteristics information, and command() when
the SESP sends orders to the LC.
The PFs from local controller to SESP are:
• get(LC, Resource CP, attributes, request())
• set(LC, Resource CP, attributes, command())
• send(LC, SESP, CL-2, attributes, get())
• store(SESP, attributes, send())
In this case, the attributes can be the technical status, technical characteristics, operational
characteristics or operational status.
The resulting SFs are a combination of the two previous sequences, the SF Request() when
the SESP sends a request() attribute and the SF Command() when it sends a command() attribute:
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• Request(SESP, Local controller, attributes)
• Command(SESP, Local controller, attributes)
The time execution of these SF can be both periodical or event based. However, each used
PF inside these SFs have an event-based time execution, as one PF triggers the next one to start
its execution.
4.5. EMPOWER Entity-Relationship Model
The ERM of the system under analysis is reflected in Figure 5. All the communication links
between entities are reflected there. From the ERM cardinality, it is possible to identify how often
communication lines are used for each function. For instance, it can be noted that the communication
line between SCADA and the local controller is used much more than the line between one specific
load and the local controller. Hence, the resilience of the link between SCADA and local controller is
much more representative for the overall resilience of the control system.
SYMBOLS AND NOTATION
Figure 5. ER model of the EMPOWER smart distribution grid.
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4.6. EMPOWER Resilience Evaluation Framework
As stated in Section 3.4, there are two approaches to assess the resilience of a system under the
proposed methodology. The following sections give examples of these two approaches.
4.6.1. EMPOWER Resilience from the Dimensions Perspective
In order to exemplify the resilience assessment from the dimensions perspective, the HLF 5—Remote
Monitoring from the EMPOWER system is addressed.
This HLF include the following use cases or sub-functions: handle meter data, handle event
signals, detect local overriding of control plan and the logging of all actions and events. These
sub-functions have to ensure that metering data from different meters are reliable and sent at desired
frequency, that this data is archived securely and that this data is also reliable and at desired frequency
reported to utility/customer.
For each resilience dimensions, it is needed to identify the requirements per each related entity
and the potential disruptions prior to identify the resilience indicators.
The requirements per each related entity are:
• Physical infrastructure dimension:
– DER Unit Controller: is functional, is connected
– SCADA: is functional, is connected, can interpret the transferred data
– Local controller: is functional, is connected
– SESP computer: is functional, can access the required data
• ICT network dimension:
– SESP Database: is functional, has free memory, is well programmed
– Customer interface: is functional, is responding fast, can handle large amounts of data
– Communication links: is connected, has the required speed, has the required latency, has the
required throughput
• Socio-economical dimension:
– Customer: takes the right decisions when getting event notifications, understands periodical reports
The identified potential disruptions are:
• Physical infrastructure dimension:
– anticipated: ageing infrastructure
– unanticipated: natural disaster, unusual load profile of components
• ICT network dimension:
– cyber attack (denial of service, etc.)
– change of used standards/protocols
– addition of new standard
– change of communication technology
• Socio-economical dimension:
– wrong human interpretation of data
– level of collaboration of customers
– unavailability of maintenance crews
– regulatory limitations on information exchange
Based on the requirements per each related entity and the potential disruptions identified,
the selected resilience indicators for each dimension are:
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• Physical infrastructure dimension:
– Failure criticality Index. it ranks the importance of elements based on a parameter of interest.
Represents the contribution to system failure of a specific component.
– Restoration criticality index: percentage of times that system restoration results from
the restoration of this component. It assesses the impact of restoration of a specific element.
– Operation criticality index: percentage of a component’s down time over the system
down time.
• ICT network dimension:
– Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR): number of packets successfully received over the expected
number of packets.
– Average End-to-End Delay: average time to transmit packages from sending application to
receiving application.
– Average Packet Hop Count: average number of intermediate nodes through which
the packets sent by a sender are routed (for example the number of meters traversed).
• Socio-economical dimension:
– Reputation score of customer: the more active a customer participates, the better is his score,
the more flexible he is for the system.
– Level of transparency of agreements: if the customer knows about potential disruptions
and their influences, the risk of disturbances is shared between the SESP operator and the
customer, making the system more resilient.
These indicators based on attributes of the system entities are used to quantify the resilience
and to determine which resilience dimension plays a more important role for the performance of
the assessed HLF.
4.6.2. EMPOWER Resilience in Function of Component Criticality
Once again, the example of the HLF 5—Remote Monitoring can be taken as an illustration. In this
HLF, the following sequences are executed: periodically handle metering data of all resources, store
metering data in a database and report metering data to customer interface.
Assuming that N is the number of DER resources, the sequence dependencies for all N DER
Resources are:
• send(DER, DER unit controller, 〈P, Q, V, I〉, 1 min)
• send(DER unit controller, SCADA, 〈P, Q, V, I〉, 1 min)
• send(SCADA, SESP, 〈P, Q, V, I〉, 1 min)
In a similar way, if M is the number of CP resources, the sequence dependencies for all M customer
premises (CP) resources are:
• send(CP, Local controller, 〈P〉, 1 min)
• send(Local controller, SESP, 〈P〉, 1 min)
In addition, to store these values in the SESP database, the following dependency is executed:
• send(SESP, SESP database, 〈Array of N attributes + Array of M attributes〉, 1 min)
Finally, for each customer (a number CDER for DER customers and CCP for household customers)
the following dependency is performed when reporting to customer interface:
• send(SESP, Customer, 〈individual update of P or P, Q, V, I〉, 1 min)
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Taking into account the number of each type of dependency and making use of the cardinality
and component criticality to calculate the resilience of a certain HLF use case, the results obtained for
the HLF 5—Remote Monitoring is:
Number o f PFs dependencies = 3× N + 2×M + 1× (3× N + 2×M) + CDER × N + CCP ×M (1)
5. Conclusions
This study has proposed a methodology to evaluate resilience of ICT platforms in Smart
distribution grids. As these grids are introducing new elements, actors and roles in the electrical
system, the resilience concept has been adapted to take them into consideration. The combination
of a standardized modelling of Smart Grids (SGAM) with the Entity Relationship Model has been
proposed to determine the criticality of functions -and elements involved- essential in the operation of
these systems.
This methodology has been developed under the EMPOWER project to assess the resilience of
a platform enabling the operation of a local energy market. A key actor identified in local energy
markets is the SESP. Taking into account that the interaction between the SESP and the elements of
the distribution grid is enabled by ICT platforms, the assessment of their resilience is fundamental to
quantify the resilience of the whole system.
This work also proposes paths for future research, such as the need for further development of
quantitative resilience indicators for the dynamic performance of the system, which is only partly
addressed in the proposed methodology. This will help to clarify how the proposed methodology
handles dynamic disruptions in the system.
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